Power play and party politics: the significance
of raving.
Author:
Martin, Daniel.
Source:
Journal of Popular Culture v. 32 no4 (Spring
1999) p. 77-99
_________________________________
The limited academic discourse surrounding rave
culture has so far
struggled to come to any concrete conclusions
concerning the political
significance of the largest, most dynamic, and
longest lasting youth
subor counterculture of the postwar era. In
attempting to reconcile rave
culture with the theories of the Birmingham
Centre for Contemporary
Cultural Studies (henceforth CCCS) or the work of
Jean Baudrillard,
academics have become lost in the ambiguity of
the experience of raving
and rave culture's differences from previous
youth movements. In this
article, I will examine the existing literature
about rave and come to
some conclusions about its cultural and political
significance. I argue
that the practice of raving and the values ravers
espouse, when combined
with its size (raving is now a worldwide
phenomena(FN1)), pose a
significant challenge to many aspects of dominant
western values.
The literature on rave, which has its roots in
the CCCS theories(FN2)
works within neo-Marxist frameworks, drawing on
the theories of Adorno,
Gramsci, and Williams, as well as on semiotic
analysis. The CCCS
concluded that subcultures such as the Teds,
Mods, and Punks were
manifestations of working-class youths' position
in society, and an
expression of alienation that would ultimately
fail and result in
incorporation into the mainstream. These youths
would grow up and, like
their parents, move into trades, without really
changing anything. Their
resistance was stylized and ritualized, without
any real political clout.
For these theorists, subcultures were "concrete,
identifiable social
formations constructed as collective response to
the material and
situated experience of their class...they were
also attempts at a
solution to that problematic experience: a
resolution that because
pitched largely at a symbolic level was fated to
fail" (Hall and
Jefferson 47). This insistence on a separation
between "symbolic"--
stylistic, non-effective--and "real," or
effective, resistance remains in
cultural studies, and I will argue that it
hinders rather than helps any
attempts to understand the significance of
raving.
The second body of work that analyzes rave could
be
termed "postmodernist,"(FN3) relating most
specifically to the work of
Baudrillard. For Baudrillard, the culture of
postmodernity has become
nothing but style--everything is as it appears,
there is no depth
or "true" meaning. Baudrillard's theories are
drawn on by the writers in
Redhead's Rave Off and also by Thornton in Club
Cultures. The majority of
this work still feels the need, as do I, to
respond to, or at least
mention, the CCCS. Other postmodernist theorists
have been used
sparingly. Stanley draws on Foucault; however, he
does not incorporate
empirical research into his article, instead
choosing to apply Foucault
to an idealized rave. While this approach is
valuable, it does not
address the kind of immediate political issues
discussed in the second
part of this article.
Much of the writing on rave culture, particularly
in Rave Off, seems to
have a confused notion of what power is, and of
what constitutes
meaningful political action. By applying
Foucault's analysis of modern
power, subjectivity, control, and politics, I
will demonstrate that
raving is in fact a highly significant cultural
movement that makes a
powerful political critique of the bases of
Western society.
RAVE, GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIAA rave is an
event/space in which people--
usually but not always--young (Merchant and
MacDonald 15-35), gather to
dance to mainly electronic music. Newcombe
defined a rave as. a long
period of constant energetic and stylistic
dancing exhibited by a large
group of people in a hot, crowded facility
providing continuous loud
House music and an accompanying strobe-lit
psychedelic light show. (qtd.
in Merchant and Macdonald 18).
This definition makes a number of normative
assumptions about the nature
of a rave--the music is not always House,(FN4)
the lights not always
psychedelic, and the facility not always hot and
crowded. A more fitting
description might be that given by Stanley: "A
rave in its most simple
sense is a party" (103). For many, drug taking is
a large part of the
experience, with the drugs of choice among ravers
being Ecstasy (MDMA),
LSD, and Speed. However, the use of drugs is by
no means mandatory, and
consumption depends very much on availability and
personal preference.
Whatever suggestions the British tabloid
newspapers may make, not all
ravers are drug users.(FN5) Raves attract a wide
variety of people,
transcending class, ethnic, gender, and sexual
orientation differences.
Raves vary in size from small house parties with
30 or 40 people to huge
music festivals attracting upwards of 30,000
people.
Any attempt to define rave culture beyond these
loose guidelines would be
too normative and exclusionary. For instance, an
attempt to define rave
as a style, in the sense that Hebdige defined
Punk as a style, would
fail. Although there are certain prevalent
tendencies within rave culture
(in particular the appropriation of fashions from
the 1960s and 1970s),
there exists no definitive description of what a
raver looks like.
Instead, " f ashion has become a spectacular
free-for-all, within which
you are as likely to see jeans and a t-shirt as
an elaborate PVC space-
suit" (qtd. in Jordan 129).
Since 1988, rave culture in Britain has elicited
a number of extremely
strong responses from other sectors of society,
particularly the British
government and the tabloid press. The so-called
"Second Summer of Love"
in 1988, which saw the first emergence of rave
culture, was followed by a
media-led moral panic focused mainly on the drug
aspect of the culture,
and related issues of law and order. This was
followed by a series of
government actions aimed at limiting raves,
culminating in the 1994
Criminal Justice Act. Strangely enough (or maybe
not so strangely if one
considers the political implications), both moral
panic and legal
sanctions continue in the face of strong advice
against them from the
police and the medical profession.
The moral panic led by the media was nothing new.
The CCCS literature
identifies and examines in detail moral panics
surrounding each of the
main sub- or countercultural movements of the
postwar era.(FN6) Media
attention on rave centered around a number of
drug related deaths, and
the assumed moral deprivation of Britain's youth,
with headlines such
as "Love Pills Kill a Perfect Son" (qtd. in
Redhead 20), and "Acid Fiends
Spike Page Three Girls Drink" (qtd. in Melechi
35).(FN7).
In a corresponding movement, the British
government brought legal
sanctions to bear on rave culture. The first of
these was "an obscure
1967 statute, the Private Places of
Entertainments Act" (Redhead 20),
which required any private entertainment
organized for financial gain to
have a license. The Licensing Act (1988) gave
police greater powers to
examine licensed premises and increased
licensing sessions
(reapplication for a club's license) from once to
seven times a year, a
measure aimed directly at nightclubs. This was
followed by the
Entertainments (Increased Penalties) Acts (1990),
which increased the
penalties for holding an unlicensed public
entertainment, imposing fines
of up to 20,000 pounds or prison sentences of up
to six months. Lastly,
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994)
had the effect of
potentially criminalizing an enormous segment of
British society by
making the organization of and attendance at
raves acts punishable by
law. This Act attacks the ability of citizens of
the U.K. to protest
against issues (roadworks, government actions,
hunts) with which they
disagree, abolishes the right to silence, forces
people to cooperate with
the police without legal advice, and, most
importantly for ravers, allows
police to stop and arrest people whom they
believe have the intention of
holding or attending a rave, whether the use of
the premises be
trespassory or not (Goodman 11-12).
These actions by the media and government in the
U.K. are plays for
power. In its denial/transgression of certain
societal norms (which many
linked solely to drug use), raving could be seen
as a threat to the
established social order:. ordering and
positioning the morally
transgressive is a modern social strategy of
containment, regulation, and
colonisation.... The very practice of naming the
unconfined, the
undisciplined nomad of the city subjects them to
classificatory
knowledge, to some appearance of order, some rule
of identification and
regulation. The ability to control the presence
of marginals as named
subjects is central to the production and
preservation of modern city
moral order. (Little 17-18).
Power implies knowledge, and knowledge implies
power. In attempting
to "know" rave culture, the media and the
government both attempt to
exercise power over it. This is not to say that
the "other," in this case
raving, must be done away with. On the contrary,
the "other" is always
necessary for the definition of the self. In this
case, the morally
corrupt, potentially insane raver is set up
against normal, sane society.
Once raving is "known," it can be inspected and
regulated, and it
then "constitutes an object for a branch of
knowledge and a hold for a
branch of power" (Foucault, Discipline 191). One
of the problems
presented by the practice of raving is that it
defies any attempt to
comprehensively "know" or study it.(FN8). This is
not to suggest that
there is some monolithic, totalizing discourse
laid down in which the
government, media, police and professional
classes/bourgeoisie attempt to
control raves. There is a large amount of
conflict within these groups.
While Parliament and the tabloid media vilify
ravers, there are
substantial, if ignored, voices from within the
police, the more serious
media and the medical profession, which stake
counterclaims to those
outlined above. Within the medical profession,
these discussions have
centered largely around the health risks involved
in drug use,
particularly as little, if anything, is known
about the long term effects
of Ecstasy use (Merchant and Macdonald 25).
There has been some vocal criticism of government
actions concerning both
raving and drug use from the police in Britain.
Chief Constable Ron
Hadfield, appointed in 1992 to investigate issues
surrounding Britain's
free festivals, expressed his reservations
somewhat strongly: "Do you
really want to introduce draconian powers and
possibly end up with a
Tiananmen Square-type scenario, all because a
crowd of New Age travellers
and kids want to play some noisy music?" (Smith
32). The media
characterized a protest against the impending
Criminal Justice Bill with
statements such as the Daily Star's: "They made a
nauseating sight. For
three hours the dregs of Britain--scroungers,
anarchists and shaven-
headed trouble makers--rampaged through London"
(qtd. in Platt
15). In contrast, the police statement painted
quite a different
picture: "we have in excess of 20,000
demonstrators, the vast majority of
which were peaceful and well intentioned. There
were a few who decided to
cause trouble and we had mounted police to deal
with that situation"
(Platt 14).
There has also been advice from the government's
Advisory Council on the
Misuse of Drugs, in a report leaked to the
Guardian:. We believe there
are dangers in over-regulation and in resorting
to the criminal law,
which may well lead to conflict between young
people and the authorities.
We recommend that the organisation of more legal
raves be encouraged by
local authorities exercising maximum discretion
in the granting of
licenses, and by involving responsible organisers
of raves in the
process. (Maylon, Raving 13).
There are a number of problems surrounding
"official" discourses and
their relationship with raving. Although advice
from experts, such as the
police and the government's own officials, have
recommended a line of
cooperation and mediation with ravers, the law
continues along a path
more in line with the moral panic tone of the
tabloid press. This would
suggest that the government's actions are based
on a rationality built on
a perceived political necessity to be seen as
upholding law and the moral
order of society. This moral duty, and the threat
which raving poses to
it, is closely linked to the use of drugs in rave
culture, which has
fueled--and been used to justify--the moral panic
of the media and
government actions against rave.
Although not all ravers are drug users, to
discuss raving without
discussing Ecstasy (MDMA, E), would be to ignore
a large and influential
part of the culture, as for many, Ecstasy and
raving do go hand-in-hand.
Little is currently known about the long term
effects of Ecstasy use, but
its short term effects are well documented (see
Merchant and Macdonald).
However, the pharmacological/health effects of
Ecstasy are of secondary
interest for the purposes of this article. It is
the effet on the user's
mental state that is important. This effect has
been described
as "positive, inducing feelings of empathy,
alertness, energy and love"
(Merchant and Macdonald 22). It is both a "dance
drug," allowing the user
to dance for hours without stopping, and a "hug
drug," making the user
feel closer to those around them, and heightening
physical sensations.
Although the medical discourse around MDMA sees
it as mostly harmless, it
has been placed on the Schedule A list of drugs,
considered by law the
equivalent of heroin or crack cocaine, despite
the fact that
psychiatrists have argued for its value as a
therapeutic aid, and the
lack of proven long-term physical side effects
(Glanzrock 17). Indeed,
its placement on the Schedule A list precludes
human-subject testing to
determine what the long term side effects might
be. This means in rave
culture, "we are witnessing...a massive,
uncontrolled field trial of a
largely untested and potentially highly dangerous
drug" (Merchant and
Macdonald 29).
The government's response to Ecstasy, and to
other "soft"
or "recreational" drugs such as cannabis and
LSD-- and its response to
raving in general--is not rational in the sense
of the term which the
government might claim. Rather, it has a
political rationality that
embraces a particular form of governmentality and
discipline based on
morality and social control. The control of
Ecstasy is tied into a moral
culture that says it is all right to take drugs
for medical reasons but
not for fun. The nature of this reasoning is
demonstrated aptly by
comparing attitudes toward Prozac to those toward
Ecstasy. Both drugs
work in a very similar way. Each inhibits the
uptake of the
neurotransmitter serotonin, which stimulates
feeling of happiness and
well-being in the brain. There is also little
known about either drug's
long-term side effects. Despite this, Prozac is
now prescribed to
millions around the world, many of whom just want
to "feel happy even if
they are not actually clinically depressed,"
whereas Ecstasy is illegal,
because it is used "to make you feel happy when
you just want to have
fun" ("Better than Well" 91).
The British Government has faced internal
criticism for the way in which
it has reacted to both rave itself and the
related drug use, although its
reaction has been based on advice from police,
the Advisory Council on
the Misuse of Drugs and the Standing Conference
on Drug Abuse. These
bodies have argued that the government should
sponsor the licensing and
testing of drugs in a manner similar to that used
in Amsterdam. The use
of drugs among British youth has reached a
point--estimates on Ecstasy
use consistently come up with a figure around
500,000 doses per week
("Better than Well" 91)?where prohibition is no
longer feasible, and may
in fact increase damage (Maylon, "Dancing" 41).
What are the reasons for continuing prohibition?
One argument concerning
the moral prohibition of drug culture is that it
is antithetical to
capitalism (D'Angelo 4). The use of drugs, and
indulgence in hedonistic
pleasures, threatens the moral basis of
capitalism, which, if we accept
Weber's thesis,(FN9) stresses hard work and
deferred gratification. The
drug user here poses a similar threat to capital
as the lunatic. However,
Foucault's anlayses of lunacy, sickness, and
sexuality suggest that the
reaction to Ecstasy, and to rave, is more complex
than this. Rave poses a
threat not just to capital (it may in fact pose
no threat to capital at
all, as I will discuss in a later section of the
article), but rather a
threat to the social order, and to the ways in
which power is exercised
in western society. Rave culture undermines the
disciplinary control and
knowing gaze of modern western governmentality,
and the legal reaction to
rave is an attempt to reestablish this kind of
power over an unwilling
object.
Although the law may define or negotiate some
characteristics of rave
culture and influence the discourses surrounding
it, the law
cannot "know" raving in any conclusive sense. The
relationship between
raving and the law is illustrated by Stanley, and
its essential ambiguity
is captured in the negotiation of space-places.
Raving operates in spaces
that have been "given over" by the law,
signifying a failure of the law
to know or control in any universal manner.
"These spaces exist as
deregulated spaces and become nominated as 'wild
zones by the state.
They are not spaces without law but they are
spaces of the without-laws"
(Stanley 91). These "wild zones" (disused
warehouses, empty fields,
carparks, or any other large, open space in which
a sound system can be
set up and people can dance) are the
reappropriation and subversion of
rational space and also alternative spaces where
other discourses can be
articulated. It is in these spaces that
"narratives of dissensus" can be
expressed (Stanley 92). Within these spaces where
the law is subverted or
avoided, resistance or escape can take place.
The space in which we live cannot be separated
from what we do in it.
Neither can space be completely separated from
mechanisms of control.
Foucault has outlined how the colonization and
rationalization of space
was central to the project of governmentality and
the evolution of modern
forms of governance (Reader 241-42). In his
discussion of the Panopticon,
architecture, space, discipline, and power come
together in a form of
almost pure control (see Discipline). Yet at the
same time that spaces of
control exist, there are also sites of
deregulation--counter-spaces--and
between these two kinds of sites there will be a
certain tension.
The problem for government emerges in the
regulation of space within the
modern urban environment, especially in an era of
deregulation:. The
difficulties of controlling the sprawl of the
urban from a disappearing
centre, as a result of both policy (deregulation)
and inevitability (the
logic of the post-industrial society), is one of
demographic control of
the organisation of the movement of peoples
between regulated (ordered)
and deregulated (disordered) spaces-places.
(Stanley 93).
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